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Abstract 
Purpose – High-reliability performance and high-hazard are intertwined in High-Reliability Organizations (HROs) operations; these organizations are highly safe, highly hazardous and highly significant 
for the modern society, not only for the valuable resources they have, but also the indispensable services they provide. This research intend to understand how HROs could produce high quality 
performance despite their challenging and demanding contexts. The research followed an emic approach to develop an organizational framework that reflects the contribution of the seeming traits of the 
organizations to the operations safety based on the workers point of views about the safety of workstations. 
Design/methodology/approach – This research adopted mixed methods of in-depth interviews and literature review to identify the structural characteristics of high-reliability organizations (HROs) 
embedded in 
the organizations studies and developed a theoretical based structural framework for HROs. Furthermore, a systemic literature review was adopted to find the evidence from the organizations literature 
for the identified 
characteristics from the interviews from the first stage. The setting for this study is six Chinese power stations, four stations in Hubei province central China and two stations in the southern China 
Guangdong province. 
Findings – The organizational framework is a key determinant to achieve high-reliability performance; however, solely it cannot explain how HROs manage the risks of hazard events and operate safely in 
highhazard 
environments. High-reliability performance is attributed to the interaction between two sets of determinants of safety and hazard. The findings of this research indicate that HROs systems would be 
described as reliable or hazardous depending on the tightly coupled setting, complexity, bureaucracy involvement and dynamicity within the systems from one hand, and safety orientation, failure 
intolerance, 
systemwide processing, the institutional setting and the employment of redundant systems on other hand.  
Originality/value – The authors developed an organizational framework of organizing the safety work in HROs. The applied method of interviewing and literature review was not adopted in any other 
researches. 
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Operations in modern organizations involve high complexity and tightly coupled technologies, the consequences of failure in such 
organizations would travel outward to influence wide urban societies. Therefore, high-reliability performance becomes one of the key assets the 
organizations could own. Being an HRO has been an interest of many organizations due to the high-reliability standards which draw the operations 
in the direction of safety. Reliability performance permits the organizational framework to approach the organization objectives without 
disappointments (Milosevic, Bass, & Combs, 2018). HROs systems utilize complex machineries in tightly coupled setting within high-hazard 
environments, according to Normal Accident Theory (NAT), HROs are considered stereotypically High-Hazard Organizations (HHOs) (Charles 
Perrow, 2011). Although the risk of hazard events in HROs operations makes the systems skeptical to large-scale disasters, HROs could obtain 
nearly full control over the errors and near misses which could lead to wreaking havoc and disastrous consequences including major system 
failures, massive destruction, and even loss of human life (Bierly & Spender, 2016). Moreover, the entitled risk of HROs operations is very low 
and the accidents are rarely occurring owing to the organizational capabilities to manage complexity and uncertainty in workplace by preserving 
safety and maintaining the reliability performance which emphasizes the error-free operations. The main guiding principle of HROs work is to 
assure the error-free operations (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991; Leveson, Dulac, Marais, & Carroll, 2009; Roberts, 1990; Karl E Weick & Roberts, 
1993). 
Giving the significant role of HROs to provide wide variety of indispensable services such as electricity, transportation, firefighting, 
healthcare, chemicals and defense, HROs are compelled to preserve safety of the systems and keep a deep sense of the potential risks no matter 





provide the significant services that cannot be afforded from elsewhere efficiently and effectively (Farjoun, 2010; Leveson et al., 2009). The 
reliability performance denotes that, the organization has maintained efficient control systems. The safety performance in HROs focuses on failures 
more than success, the systems are designed around the safety goals and measures in order to pay full attention to errors and navigate the operations 
towards reliability rather than uncertainty and predictions (K. E. Weick, 2016).  
1.1 The Theoretical Contribution 
Over the years, the research interest in organizations safety has been shifted from what makes organizations risky from the standing point of 
Safety I to consider what makes them safe from the standing point of Safety II (Haavik, Antonsen, Rosness, & Hale, 2016). This research adopts 
the Safety II approach to identify the characteristics of HROs and develop a framework for the organizations working in high-hazard environments. 
This research contributes to the High-Reliability Theory (HRT) by developing a framework that can be used to determine if an organization can 
produce safety performance under high-hazard environments and the convenience of applying a systematic process to develop the safety 
performance based on the characteristics of the organizations. Further, the research contributes to the theoretical debate of HRT-NAT by 
consolidating the reasoning of both theories into a framework of HROs. In this research, HRT-NAT are considered either complimentary or 
compatible with each other. The findings of this research expand the understanding of researchers and practitioners about a possible mechanism 
to improve the organizational performance by adopting the characteristics of HROs as a benchmark in non-HROs to prevent accidents under the 





1.2 Research Statement  
The unavailability of a standardized framework of HROs illustrates the lack of empirical research on high-reliability research about how to 
develop the organizational performance to the reliability level (Agwu, Labib, & Hadleigh-Dunn, 2019). Different from the Structural reliability 
assessment which concerns assessing the probability of hazard event in extreme conditions (Zuniga, Murangira, & Perdrizet, 2020), this research 
inspired by the theoretical debate of HRT-NAT about the ability of organizations to produce high quality performance despite the challenging and 
demanding environments. This research develops an organizational framework based on how the theories appreciate the hazard nature of 
organizations and the managerial aspects of operations in high-hazard environments. While HRT has faith in organizations to adopt the right 
capabilities to prevent the accidents in complex and tightly coupled systems, NAT believes that the accidents are inevitable no matter how good 
the capabilities organizations have. Theoreticians are either optimistic as for HRT (Reason, 2016; K. M. Sutcliffe, 2011; Karl E Weick, 1987) or 
pessimistic as for NAT (Charles Perrow, 2011; Rijpma, 1997; Sagan, 1995). In this research, a realistic approach was adopted to understand how 
the two theories can be reconciled since both theories could be considered valid at different points of time, while NAT is valid at the time of 
accidents, HRT is valid at the time of normal operations. Regarding the organizational structure, this research overlooks the tensions between the 
theories to understand what makes the performance safe from HRT point of view and hazardous from NAT point of view. This approach enable 
us to identify the characteristics that make the complex and tightly coupled systems operate safely in HROs.  





In the mid-eighties, scholars at University of California, Berkeley, have introduced HRO to the organizations research; La Porte, Gene 
Rochlin, Paul Schulman and Karlene Roberts have presented their insights in numerous publications. The group identified four organizations that 
meet and even exceed the established standards of reliable performance set by the society. The four organizations are operating in high-hazard 
environments with complex technologies nearly accident-free; The Air Traffic Control System (ATC), The Electric Operations and Power 
Generation Departments, The peacetime flight operations of the US Navy’s Carrier Group 3 and its two nuclear aircraft carriers and the PGE’s 
Diablo Canyon plant have set the model for the reliable organizations. In the 1990s, HROs became a so-called area of organizations research, 
theorizing of high-reliability and high-hazard organizations were often conducted within the scope of safety management. ATC performance has 
been thoroughly investigated under the HRO trending theme. (Morris & Moore, 2000; O'Neil & Krane, 2012; Karl E Weick, 1987) studied the 
ATC and Air Operation’s high-reliability within the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). (O'Neil & Krane, 2012; O'Neil & Kriz, 2013) focused 
on the ATC’s policy, structure and protocols of (FAA) in the environmental system and the collective influence of the policy and Aviation agencies 
on the ATC. 
Over the time, research became more concerned about the non-operational aspects, (Morris & Moore, 2000) assessed the learning process of 
the aviation pilots and the ATC organizational accountability system. Moreover, (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991) investigated the complexity and 
tight coupling within two aircraft carriers, US air traffic control, utility grid management and firefighting teams. (Karl E Weick, 1987) studied the 
U.S. Navy culture and the decision making process in high-hazard environments, Weick underlined the significant role of reliability culture in 





naval culture and nuclear submarine framework, the culture on the nuclear submarine is a key source of reliability. The study concluded that, the 
nuclear navy meets the criteria for HROs due to the strong organizational culture (C Perrow, 1984). Gradually, the research interest diverted to the 
principles of HROs, the research from (W. Sutcliffe, 2006; Karl E Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2008) provided a conceptual framework for 
incorporating the cognitive mindfulness principles into the organizational practices to achieve reliability performance. Recently, (Agwu et al., 
2019) build a maturity framework based on the five mindfulness principles proposed by (Karl E Weick et al., 2008) to prevent disasters in high-
hazard environments. 
Reliability was introduced in the field of engineering for the purpose of assessing the efficacy of the systems structures and infrastructures 
to handle the complexity and uncertainty (Pan & Dias, 2017). Several approaches were followed to quantitatively analyze the risks integrated in 
operations in high-hazard environments, structural reliability methods (Ditlevsen & Madsen, 1996), Monte Carlo simulation, Bayesian Monte 
Carlo (BMC) (Rasmussen & Ghahramani, 2003), Petri Nets (PN) (Cavone, Dotoli, & Seatzu, 2017; Chen, Li, & Zhou, 2013; Kabir & 
Papadopoulos, 2019; Weber, Medina-Oliva, Simon, & Iung, 2012), enhanced Bayesian network (eBN) (Straub & Der Kiureghian, 2010). 
Regarding the role of human error in accidents, the eBNs contributed to developing the Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) which concerns the 
causes and effects relationship between the human errors and accidents in high-hazard environments (Kabir & Papadopoulos, 2019). HRA has 
emerged as a hot topic over the past decade (Groth & Mosleh, 2012; Mkrtchyan, Podofillini, & Dang, 2016; Podofillini & Dang, 2013; Su, 







2.1 Research setting 
General HRO Context. The setting for this study is Six Chinese Power stations, four stations in Hubei province central China and two 
stations in the southern China Guangdong province. Two hydroelectric stations, three thermal power stations and one nuclear station.  
During the first stage of this research, two safety personnel were interviewed from each of the stations, at least one of them is an engineer in 
charge of the safety of the station (12 interviews). The safety engineers represent key informants because they are highly knowledgeable about the 
systems. The interviewees were predominantly males (11 males and 1 female as observed the workforces were predominately males), the average 
work experience is 15 years among the interviewees. The semistructured interviews represent the primary data source, the interviews were 
conducted on one-on-one sessions to present the open-end questions which were utilized to identify the key features of the organizations with the 
intent to understand how the interviewees describe their organizations. The emic approach was followed to understand the seeming traits of the 
organizations based on the workers point of views about the safety of workstations. The interview questions were Safety II driven to emphasize 
the success tendencies which employ the reasoning to study their performance under HROs theme. The key informant in this study is coded as 
informant 1, works for a nuclear power station. The second author carried the task of translating the questions into Chinese and checked the 
accuracy of the answers in addition to conducting the two pilot interviews.  
In the second stage, a systemic literature review was adopted (Tranfield, Denyer, & Smart, 2003; Tsoukas, 2009) to find the supported 





coupled, Complex, Dynamic, Bureaucratic, Safety Oriented, Failure Intolerant, Systemwide processor, Institutional and Redundant. The peer-
reviewed literature published before October 2020 was explored. The search was conducted using five electronic databases (Elsevier, Science 
Direct, EBSCO Host – Business Source Complete, SCOPUS, and ABI – ProQuest) for academic publications in relation to the search string 
combination developed in Table 1. The characteristics represent the core of the structural framework together with the representative data from 
stage 1 in Table 2. A consecutive search was conducted to find the relevant articles in leading journals (e.g., Safety Science and Academy of 
Management Review, Organization & Environment, Journal of Organizational Behavior, Academy of Management Journal, Journal of Risk 
Analysis, Journal of Management and Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management). The search process consisted of two successive stages, 
the first stage involved searching the titles or abstracts for the keywords of High-reliability Theory, High-reliability organizations, Normal Accident 
Theory, High-hazard organizations, Resilience Engineering and their acronyms HRT, HRO/s, NAT, HHO/s and RE. The second stage involved 
searching for the strings of the characteristics identified through the observations from stage one, Table 1 includes the key words of stage two, 
which included the terms of main interest such as reliable and tight coupling, their synonyms such as Sustainable and interdependence, and the 
alternative words such as trustworthy and connected.  
2.2 Data Analysis  
The primary task of the systemic literature review is to find the scholarly papers in relation to the characteristics of HROs, the researches on 
HHOs and resilience engineering was considered in terms of the similarity of working in high-hazard environments. Including HHOs and resilience 





(Krippendorff, 2004). Firstly, the theoretical aspects of literature were coded, and then coding the identified characteristics from the previous 
stages so the search process run on a systematic basis. The qualitative data analysis software NVIVO 12 was used for coding. Since the objective 
of this research is to develop a general framework, it was necessary to avoid any potential industry or organizational biases in stage two, in order 
to ensure the diversity and generality of the identified characteristics, there were no preferences for research papers about certain type of 
organizations or industry line. 
Table 1 
Characteristics and Representative Literature 
Characteristic Keywords Benchmarks from literature 
Hazardous Hazard, Hazardous, Risk, Risky, Disaster, Catastrophe, 
Catastrophic, Fail, Failure, Unpredictable and Uncertain  
(Bourrier, 2011; Erin Bass & Milosevic, 2018; Ford, 2018; 
Leveson, Dulac, Marais, & Carroll, 2009; Perrow, 2011) 
Tightly coupled Coupled, Tight Coupled, Coupling, Interconnected, 
Interdependent and Interdependence,   
(Erin Bass & Milosevic, 2018; Ford, 2018; Hopkins, 2001; 
Perrow, 2011; Rijpma, 1997) 
Complex Complex, Interdependence, Interdependent, Intricacy, 
Intensive-Technology and Interconnected. 
(Bierly & Spender, 2016; LaPorte & Consolini, 1991; 
Leveson et al., 2009; W. Sutcliffe, 2006; Weick, Sutcliffe, & 
Obstfeld, 2008) 
Dynamic Dynamic, Dynamicity, Change, Robust Actions, 
Interactions, Flexibility, Evolving, Impulsive, Developing 
and Responsive  
(Casler, 2014; Enya, Pillay, & Dempsey, 2018; Farjoun, 
2010; Ivana Milosevic & Erin Bass, 2014; Morris & Moore, 
2000; Perrow, 2011; K. M. Sutcliffe, 2011) 
Bureaucratic Bureaucratic, Bureaucracy, Control, Structure, Restrict, 
Constrains, Rigidity, Obeying, Routine, Policies, Norms, 
Standard and Procedures  
(Bass & Chakrabarty, 2014; Bierly III & Spender, 1995; 
Catino & Patriotta, 2013; Erin Bass & Milosevic, 2018; 
Feldman & Pentland, 2003; LaPorte & Consolini, 1991) 
Safety Oriented Safe, Safety, Error-Free, Mistake-Free Clear Record, 
Efficacy, Cognitive Processing, Correct, Supportive, 
Firmly, Acceptable Levels, Containment, Survive, Safety 
Measurements and Safe Environment. 
(Catino & Patriotta, 2013; Ford, 2018; Peiró Silla, Gracia 
Lerín, & Martínez-Córcoles, 2018; Perrow, 2011; K. M. 
Sutcliffe, 2011) 
Failure Intolerant Fail, Failure Intolerance, Failure Unforgiven, Technical 
Failure, Risk, Risk Intolerant, Secure, Securely, Disorder, 
(Lekka & Sugden, 2011; I. Milosevic, Bass, & Combs, 2018; 





Mess, Correct, Preoccupation With Failure, Incidents, 
Prevention, Mistake-Free, Accident And System Error  
Systemwide process Systemwide, System-Wide, Broad Scale, Wide-Manner, 
Large Scale, Common Procedures, General Procedures, 
Extensive, Cognitive Processing, Strategy, Strategic, 
Strategic Coordination And Centralization 
(Andriulo, Arleo, de Carlo, Gnoni, & Tucci, 2015; Roberts, 
1989; Vogus & Rerup, 2017; Weick & Roberts, 1993) 
Institutional Learning, Continuous Learning, Knowledge, New 
Knowledge, Cognition, Repertories, Trialing, Training 
And Experience 
(Catino & Patriotta, 2013; Ford, 2018; Levinthal & Rerup, 
2006; Macrae & Draycott, 2016; I. Milosevic et al., 2018; 
Ron, Lipshitz, & Popper, 2006; Weick et al., 2008) 
Redundant Redundant, Redundancy, Backup, Substitution, Replicate, 
Corrective, Secondary, Alternative, Additional, 
Substitutes. 
(Bourrier, 2011; Busby & Iszatt-White, 2014; Perrow, 1994; 
Pillay, 2014; Weick et al., 2008) 
 
Table 2 
Structural Framework of High Reliability Organizations (FSR) 
Dimension Characteristics 
High Hazard organizations HHO 
An organization working in high hazard context, 
Consequently, the organization failed to sustain error-free operations 
and accidents and disasters are inevitable. 
  High Reliability Organizations HRO 
An organization which is well financed and boosted to have the right 
capabilities to prevent failures and disasters under high hazard conditions. 
Although the operations are nearly error-free, a small fault amid such hazard 
contexts would lead to a disaster. 
Hazard 
Hazardous Failures and accidents are unpreventable and The organization does 
not employ the competencies and expertise needed to response to 
contingencies events. 
The high hazard challenge the organizational capabilities to balance the forces of 
high hazard and safety and sustain performance by means of accident prevention. 
Tightly Coupled Tight coupling and interdependences makes the more skeptical to 
accidents and disasters. Tight coupling spread the failures between the 
interdependent systems. 
Tightly coupled systems are convenient for centralized control and keep the 
systemwide commands more efficient. Tight coupling endorse accident 
prevention by spreading transmitting the perturbations and prevent developing 
errors. 
Complex Tight coupling contributes to the system complexity which is already 
exist because of the multidimensional relations between the 
organization system and surrounding environment. Categorization 
and simplicity makes the system 
The system ensures that, the complex interrelations are well-understood and the 
complex of hazard operations are well attended and the implications of which, 
are accounted for.  
Dynamic Dynamicity requires high responsiveness and timely interactions 
which are not afforded due to the complexity of operations that creates 
difficulty to timely adjust and adapt to change. 
The system is very sensitive to change in surroundings and actions are migrating 
to expertise where they are. Furthermore, at the time of nonroutine, the system 
allows considerable flexibility to neutralize the hazard events.  
Bureaucratic The practices are pre-established and the hazard consequences cause 
the system to be crumbling since complex tight coupling technologies 
are not appreciated as they should be. 
The operations are executed following to the operations manual which accounted 
for relatively all possibilities of hazard events and the prescribed procedures are 
extensively reviewed. Moreover, reasonable flexibility are allowed at the 
nonroutine time. 
Safety 
Safety Oriented The organization would experience tension of competing 
organizational goals and interests such as production size, and safety 
goals which make the activities less focused on safety. 
Maintaining reliable performance is the main objective of the organizations and 
all the activities navigate towards the direction of safety. Safety principles govern 
the operations to ensure that the operations remain error-free and the cognitive 





Failure Intolerant The organization would be more tolerant to the errors and there is a 
tendency to find someone to blame for failures which weaken the 
accident prevention policies and create a tendency to be insensible to 
problems if they are not directly concern to the individual mission. 
In the core of the organizational culture, the failure intolerance is central to 
preserve the reliability performance, at the time of nonroutine, problems are 
accurately addressed and resolved with no blame on individuals. At this time, the 
system takes the opportunity to review the operations procedures and learn new 
lessons. 
Systemwide processing While the systems are managed separately, centralization enables the 
system to deal with the interdependences but still complexity are 
difficult to be understood in the absence of systemwide processing 
function. 
The system can adjust between centralized control, which fits well with the 
tightly coupled technologies and decentralized control that facilitates managing 
the complexity.  
Institutional The organization benefits from errors as opportunities to learn and 
create knowledge, these errors are often joined by disastrous 
consequences. Although the system is luckily engaging in knowledge 
creation practices, the information accessibility is challenging owing 
to the dynamicity. 
The organizational learning, training, continuous learning and knowledge 
creations stand as a backbone of the reliability performance, the knowledge 
system works alongside with the communication channels to provide individuals 
with the information needed for preserving the reliability performance. The 
system relies on simulations owing to the failure orientation and intolerance. 
Redundant Redundant systems increase the probability of disasters owing to the 
difficulty to control the system since the organization is already 
experience an overwhelming structural complexity coming from the 
tight coupling . 
At the time of nonroutine, redundant systems are substituting the failed 
components to preserve the performance, redundancy is significant principle of 







3. THE FINDINGS 
For more than three decades, organizations reliability has been an emerging research domain, the research expanded the body of Management 
Science, Sociology, Political Science, Psychology, Anthropology, and Public Administration (Haavik et al., 2016). Yet, there is a lack of consensus 
on the meaning of reliability and how reliability performance could be maintained and sustained in high-hazard environments, which make it hard 
to adopt a general definition of the phenomena (Rochlin, 1993). Within the discourse of organizations safety, there are three theoretical streams 
were underlined; Normal Accident Theory NAT (C Perrow, 1984), High-Reliability Theory HRT (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991; Karl E Weick, 
1987) and Resilient Engineering RE (Hollnagel & Woods, 2006). The current study draws on the highlighted theories to identify the common 
characteristics of HROs structures and develop the structural framework whereas NAT and RE could operate under the HRT umbrella. 
3.1 Characteristics of HROs 
Reliability performance is produced on the basis of safety and trust in the organizational capabilities, excellence in safety is pronounced to 
be the distinguishing feature of HROs. (Bourrier, 2011) emphasized on the significant role of HROs in the modern societies, HROs contribute 
essentially to the economic and social systems by providing a requisite variety of vital and indispensable services thanks to their enhanced 
performance. Research on HROs has attracted considerable attention since the services provided by HROs are of high demand such as electricity 
production, health care and firefighting. Scholars tend to be rigorous to describe an organization as HRO, given that high-reliability is meant to be 





(Bourrier, 2011). Assessing the organizational reliability is inspiring for both researchers and practitioners to understand how HROs obtain such 
high level of trust, credibility and influence on substantial sectors of the economic and social systems.  
Reliability performance permeates through the organizational structure to shield the operations against the potential hazards. Reliability 
performance endorses the organizational capabilities to prevent failures and disasters (Erin Bass & Milosevic, 2018). Yet, researchers suggested 
several explanation for reliability performance, (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991; Roberts, 1990) attributed reliability performance to the deference to 
the technical expertise, continuous learning, and systemwide processing. Correspondingly, (Farjoun, 2010; Ramos, Droguett, Mosleh, & Moura, 
2020) indicated that organizations rely on the experienced workers to achieve reliability performance; the meaningful experience fosters the 
individuals understanding of complex situations. According to (Milosevic et al., 2018), the efficient knowledge system is believed to be a key 
source of reliability. (Bigley & Roberts, 2001) highlighted that the adoption of a refined bureaucracy as one of the reasons behind reliability 
performance however, (Milosevic et al., 2018; Karl E Weick et al., 2008) suggested that reliability performance comes from the careful attention 
to failures and error leaden actions that stems from the strict adherence to the safety protocols in the routine time, and the considerably flexible 
control at the time of nonroutine time.  
The former director of U.S. Naval Reactors office, Admiral Hyman G. Rickover stressed on the significant role of individuals in achieving 
reliability performance, discipline and training allow individuals to neutralize the small incidents before developing bigger disasters (LaPorte & 
Consolini, 1991; Wilson, Burke, Priest, & Salas, 2005). The job training promotes the individuals characters to match the requirements of HROs 





& Spender, 2016). (Milosevic et al., 2018) emphasized that, sustainable reliability requires continual awareness of the workplace safety and 
collective engagement in safety practices, well attendance to the operations events to apply the needed adaptations is essential to accommodate 
the nonroutine event and timely adapt to it (Turner & Rindova, 2012). With a reference to the government role in supporting organizations to 
achieve reliability, (Tolk & Cantu, 2018) believe that, reliability performance cannot be sustained in long-term without a well-established policy 
that enforces safety standards in all organizational aspects. To conclude, safety performance in HROs requires a strict adherence to the safety 
standards and principles and prioritizing the safety goals which can be achieved by following the comprehensive operations manual that underlines 
safety and risk possibilities in the workplace. Individuals are required to mindfully proceed with caution under the stressful circumstances to 
prevent disasters and achieve the organizational objectives.  
HROs are described as reliable, hazardous, tightly coupled, complex, dynamic, bureaucratic, safety oriented, failure intolerant, systemwide 
processor, institutional, and redundant in Table 3. While there is an agreement between HRT, NAT and RE on three distinctive characteristics of 
organizations working in high-hazard environments; hazardous, tightly coupled and complex, there are other characteristics, which represent 
obvious sources of conflict between theories such as safety oriented and failure intolerant. These characteristics are distinguishing features of 
HROs, which they outperform other organizations on acting on them, however there are fault tolerant systems which share some of the 
characteristics and could possibly employ them in an efficient manner throughout their operations such as high-hazard organizations, which also 
could execute HROs principles in their practices (Enya, Pillay, & Dempsey, 2018; Karl E Weick et al., 2008). In practical terms, replicating the 





within workplace. Developing organizations performance to HRO level will definitely create a safer future for organizations with little or no social 
and economic devastating consequences. 
3.1.1 Hazardous 
HROs are prone to large scale disasters and their operations entail high public and private risks (M. Bourrier, 2011). Controlling hazard 
events within HROs systems is crucial for the business survival (Lekka & Sugden, 2011; Pillay, 2014; Karl E Weick et al., 2008). Although the 
missions of HROs are essential, the attached economic and social costs of their failures outweigh the expected benefits (Erin Bass & Milosevic, 
2018). The consequences of failures are not limited to the equipment but also, serious injuries and loss of human lives may result from the escalation 
of hazard events (Bass & Milosevic, 2018; Bierly & Spender, 2016; Charles Perrow, 1994). Failures could lead to major breakdowns of essential 
services and possibly entire sectors. Consequently, HROs systems are required to sustain the error-free operations because failure is too disastrous 
to be endured or tolerated (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991; Milosevic et al., 2018). 
On one hand, HROs are likely to develop hazard events owing to the system’s complexity and dynamicity of operations, on the other hand, 
the reliability performance stands as a firewall, which blocks the potential failures and safeguard the systems against disasters. Lack of appreciation 
of the hazard nature at the time of nonroutine events could produce impulsive behaviors that lead to failures (Erin Bass & Milosevic, 2018). NAT 
theorist (Charles Perrow, 2011) emphasized that, the complex and tightly coupled systems are likely to develop accidents within the high-hazard 





despoiling with serious consequences, which affect large populations. Complexity fuels the hazard inclinations of HROs; the poor understanding 
of the interdependences between systems would lead to disasters. Although, complexity contributes to creating disasters, it also denotes valuable 
lessons for organizations to pay more attention to prevent accidents and improve safety in operations, complexity inspires organizations to be more 
prepared and attentive to disasters. 
Moreover, the deeply entrenched bureaucratic control contributes to the hazard events in HROs by allowing the individuals to disregard 
potential risks and stick to certain procedures at the time of nonroutine events (Ford, 2018), underestimating the potential risks would probably 
constraint the individuals readiness and responsiveness to the changes in the environment (Kapucu, Berman, & Wang, 2008). (Bierly & Spender, 
2016) indicated that, hazard restricts HROs ability to benefit from trial/error learning and the use of empirical science techniques to create new 
knowledge. Moreover, according to Rickover, the use of technologies and automation carries risk for HROs operations, system design must avoid 
automation unless the absolute necessary since the constant attendance of well-trained staff is essential to manage the operations consistently with 
the safety measures (Busby & Iszatt-White, 2014; Karl E Weick, 1987).  
3.1.2 Tightly Coupled  
HROs operations are known as time-dependent and time-honored processes, of which the highly interdependent technologies have invariant 
sequences and limited slack resources (Karl E Weick et al., 2008). In such interactively complex environment, anticipating the consequences of 





Stanley, & Havlin, 2010) emphasized that, tightly coupled systems are more vulnerable to failures, high interdependence between the system 
components and between the events would significantly contribute to propagating the failures to the general systems (Kabir & Papadopoulos, 
2019). From NAT perspective, tightly coupled systems which combine lack of control with high uncertainty are more likely to develop accidents, 
giving the inability to control the complex systems in the long run because these systems require a centralized control over their tightly coupled 
setting together with a decentralized control needed to handle complexity (Charles Perrow, 2011). In contrast, HRT highlighted that, tightly 
coupled systems become manageable if organizations could afford the appropriate capabilities (Leveson et al., 2009), systems should be able to 
adapt to wide variety of situations and reconfigure accordingly, so it could be possible to provide centralized or decentralized control over their 
operations (Haavik et al., 2016). However, with the political incentive attached to maintaining success and error-free operations, HROs allows the 
systems to relocate the available resources to support efficiency goals rather than improving safety (Pettersen & Schulman, 2019). 
HRT is based on the fact that, under certain conditions, interactively complex and tightly coupled system will not fail (Karl E Weick et al., 
2008), the implementation of redundant systems together with considerate managerial practices guided by mindful organizing will promote the 
operations safety to the level of reliability. Furthermore, (Bierly III & Spender, 1995) indicated that, tightly coupled systems are more efficient in 
transmitting the perturbations between subsystems to prevent the development of consecutive failures. For HROs, interdependence denotes that 
reliability performance is a joint achievement rather than sum of localized achievements (Timothy J Vogus, 2011), all procedures and activities in 
the system are required to be functioning simultaneously to produce the error-free performance. (K. M. Sutcliffe, 2011) suggested that, in HROs, 





increase the probability of disasters since the circumstances that produce these incidents may get along quickly without a sound understanding 
about what they will develop. Building on these, the following proposition was established: 
Proposition 1: In HROs, the tightly-coupled setting increases the possibility of errors and demotes reliability. 
3.1.3 Complex 
HROs as yet known exhibit complexity in many aspects; tightly coupled structures, complex operations and practices, and entangled relations 
with the surroundings including the counterparts and environment (Charles Perrow, 2011), systems complexity decreases the dependability of 
systems (Kabir & Papadopoulos, 2019). Analyzing the complexity is vital to understanding how the systems may fail and consequently decide 
which preventive action to control the potential failure. The system design emphasize on the safety measures to tackle the complexity, being 
attentive to the potential risks allows the systems to manipulate the operations and produce safety performance (K. M. Sutcliffe, 2011). Owing to 
the significant role of HROs, the complexity attached to the systems must be well-understood and the lure of simplicity become the last concern 
for organizations. From structural perspective, complexity comes from high interdependence of the internal systems and it also extends to the 
operations and behaviors. Moreover, complexity is embodied in the external environment such as the relationship with other organizations, 
government agencies and their policy systems which regulate the industry activities (Sagan, 1995), HROs are required to account for the influence 





(Karl E Weick et al., 2008) believed that, HROs must dodge the inclinations to simplicity in the workplace by leaning to expertise and 
avoiding the categorization and typologies that blur the decision-making, such practices contempt for the risk signs in hazard environments 
(Milosevic et al., 2018). Giving the complexity of systems, recklessness and risk-taking behaviors would produce disasters (Feldman & Pentland, 
2003; Maglio, Scott, Davis, Allen, & Taylor, 2016), instead, individuals are required to develop a reactionary and flexible mindset that maintains 
continuous awareness and favor intricacy over simplicity while coping the potential failures (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003). The developed HROs 
mentality underlines the mindfulness behaviors such as analyzing and questioning the evidences rather than taking risks to apply prescribed actions 
without firm consideration of the consequences. Furthermore, leaning to the known procedures would create blind spots on possible failures 
(Milosevic et al., 2018), the tension between obeying the standardized procedures and the flexibility needed for managing the unexpected events 
embraces a temporal paradox within HROs operations. Building on these, the following proposition was established: 
Proposition 2: In HROs, the complexity of interrelations within the systems and in the surrounding environment increases the possibility of 
errors and demotes reliability. 
3.1.4 Dynamic 
Operations in HROs are constantly evolving in a relatively unpredictable manner (Karl E Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). HROs dynamic nature 
stems from the continuous interactions between the interdependent system components (Milosevic et al., 2018). In such dynamic environments, 





comprehended. Individuals deal with the system as a living thing, they are often encountered by unknown problems that require timely actions 
(McChrystal, Collins, Silverman, & Fussell, 2015). Given that the impulsive interactions would quickly develop a disaster, all events must be well-
attended and appropriately responded to. At the time of nonroutine, owing to the functional dependencies in HROs systems, it would be a matter 
of hours or minutes or even seconds to transform the small incident into a complex disaster with fewer or no options to resolve it (K. M. Sutcliffe, 
2011).  
(Thiry, 2002) suggested that, HROs tend to be more flexible to accommodate the external environmental changes than other organizations 
working in high-hazard environments. The dynamics in HROs internal operations such as interdependences of the systems increase the likelihood 
of hazard events, therefore, HROs systems are needed to be rather responsive and moderately flexible to cope and react to the evolving events and 
be able to create new solutions to the new problems (Drucker, 1992; Nonaka, 1991). In the meanwhile, there a reasonable concern for the flexibility 
tendencies, at the time of nonroutine, flexibility would carry high risk and make individuals less focused on the strategic safety goals (Denyer, 
Kutsch, Lee-Kelley, & Hall, 2011). The systemwide monitoring task is crucial to handling dynamicity, the monitoring system is required to address 
all component of the systems to resolve the new problems at the most convenient time by determining and applying the suitable solutions (Ford, 
2018). Moreover, the voluntary error reporting systems in HROs is considered a key risk mitigation tool, it promotes the system defenses to keep 
alert to changes in operations (Bourrier, 2011). Building on these, the following proposition was established: 





3.1.5 Bureaucratic  
HROs bureaucratic control represents a profound organization convention, the reliability performance stems from the standardized operations 
and prescribed procedures which follow a well-established and instructive operations manual (Milosevic et al., 2018). HROs systems are based on 
a bureaucratic control mode in which, strictly adhering to the rules becomes a must, owing to the high-risks convoying any inconsiderable flexibility 
(Bierly III & Spender, 1995; K. M. Sutcliffe, 2011). The operations must be executed and thoroughly managed according to the bureaucratic 
hierarchy which shows a great respect to expertise and experience (Karl E Weick et al., 2008), the strict utilization of the predetermined procedures 
endorses reliability performance, adherence to the rules preserves operations safety (Yassin & Martonik, 2004). The bureaucratic control moderates 
the interactions between the technical and cultural systems to produce reliability. Vital system functions rely heavily on the bureaucratic rules such 
as safety check-ups and performance auditing to avoid the deviations which are strongly uninvited (Bierly & Spender, 2016).  
Obeying the bureaucratic orders and appropriately applying the prescribed procedures are central practices to eliminate the potential risks 
(Milosevic et al., 2018). HROs count on the comprehensive operations manual which accounts for the possibilities of risk to reallocate the system 
resources when needed and preserve the reliability performance at the time of nonroutine (March, 1991; Roberts, 1990). Furthermore, reliability 
culture supports the bureaucratic control by implementing high centralization and wide processing into activities through training and learning 
processes (Bierly & Spender, 2016). Yet, the systems strive for stability is restrained by the considerable flexibility needed for managing the 
dynamic nonroutine event, (Thackaberry, 2004) suggested that, the safety norms are not necessarily bureaucratic while going through nonroutine 





flexibility would be considered beneficial for keeping the higher level system of knowledge updated. Building on these, the following proposition 
was established: 
Proposition 4: In HROs, the bureaucratic control increases the possibility of errors and demotes reliability. 
3.1.6 Safety Oriented 
In the pursuit of reliability, safety represents a strategic goal and a condition of business survival, preserving safety comes ahead of any other 
objective, HROs are required to continuously commit to safety measures and risk management tools such as: incident and near miss reporting, 
permit-to-work and job safety analysis (JSA) (Boin & Schulman, 2008). The label of HRO is implicitly assuring that, the organization has an 
outstanding safety record and a set of basic safety principles for operations (Rochlin, 1993). HROs operations are oriented to safety, the system 
control is committed to high cognitive processing and application of predetermined procedures that ensure the error-free performance and prevent 
accidents (olde Scholtenhuis & Dorée, 2014). HROs operate within high-hazard environments with exceptionally safe performance shielding by 
means of reliability performance and demonstrate safety by experiencing few or no accidents under extremely hazardous conditions (Samuels, 
2010; Saunders, 2015).  
(Karl E Weick et al., 2008) argued that, the reason behind HROs superior performance is the enactment of mindfulness, which endorses the 
individuals to manage uncertainty and maintain focus on the present moment by being more attentive and aware about the workplace (Timothy J. 





of HROs that guides individuals to achieve reliability performance. (Samuels, 2010) indicated that, performance auditing and the strong supportive 
reliability culture endorse HROs to handle hazard situations at acceptable levels of performance (Youngberg, 2004). Moreover, HROs design is 
based on accident-prevention to eliminate accidents that may be caused by errors in the design which accounts for 60 percent of accidents in high-
hazard environments (Bhattacharjee, Ghosh, & Young-Corbett, 2011). Building on these, the following proposition was established: 
Proposition 5: In HROs, safety orientation endorses reliability performance and decreases the possibility of errors. 
3.1.7 Failure Intolerant  
HROs are highly susceptible to dreadful and large-scale events with social and economic devastating consequences of errors (Erin Bass & 
Milosevic, 2018). Consequently, the social and political setting in which they operate is unforgiving and demanding persistent safe operations to 
avoid such events, small incidents or bigger crashes would trigger the failure alarm (Leveson et al., 2009). (Charles Perrow, 2011) emphasized 
that, HROs hazard nature dictates the need for an efficient accident prevention program and polices that preserve the reliability performance 
(Saunders, 2015; Karl E Weick et al., 2008). While reliability performance is based on error-free operations, failure intolerance represents the 
philosophy of HROs safety work, it serves as the defense mechanism of accident prevention. The preoccupation with failure denotes insightful 
lessons for safety to decrease the probability of disasters according to organizations scholars and practitioners (Ford, 2018; Jahn & Black, 2017; 





According to (Karl E Weick, 1987; Karl E Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015), the human error is an explanation for the organizational failures, the 
accidents occur because workers fail to anticipate the consequences of their actions on operations. Employing error tolerance policies is too risky 
in high-hazard contexts alike HROs and therefore, organizations rely heavily on failure intolerance to alleviate the manmade errors and avoid 
ignorance and apathy which lead to accidents. Failure intolerance denotes that, HROs systems prohibit the empirical based training and learning 
in favor of simulations (Clarke, 1993). Failure intolerance is associated with systemwide processing and tight coupling, the overwhelming 
systemwide optimization process of the tightly coupled systems could lead to failure which propagates quickly to the interdependent systems 
concluding by disaster (Bierly & Spender, 2016). Furthermore, according to (Charles Perrow, 2011), failure could be a consequence of the technical 
problems and/or administrative errors which give way to disorders and possibly develop disasters. Emphasizing on the role of complex technology 
in failures, Perrow accused the use of intensive-technologies of system failure when accompanied with dynamicity and complexity (Bierly & 
Spender, 2016; Charles Perrow, 1994), that illustrates why Rickover decided to ban intensive automation while designing the nuclear submarine. 
Building on these, the following proposition was established: 
Proposition 6: In HROs, failure intolerance endorses the reliability performance and decreases the possibility of error. 
3.1.8 Systemwide Process 
HROs operations deploy extensive processing functions which are executed in a widely manner such as monitoring, safety inspections and 





systems, wide processing is associated with the centralized strategic coordination that allows coping operations in a systematic manner and 
accounting for all possibilities of failures. (Charles Perrow, 2011) indicated that, centralization is merely considered the efficient administrative 
theme to maintain safety in the complex and tightly coupled systems. HROs operations follow rigorous rules of systemwide command, the systems 
rely heavily on wide processing to assure that all procedures are executed in the most perfect manner, which mind for all subsystems as a part of 
the general framework. Owing to the high complexity of HROs systems, understanding the interdependences between components becomes 
compulsory (Williams et al., 2017). Wide processing endorses HROs systems to be aware of the consequential effects of their actions on the 
interdependent systems while tuning any of the components (K. M. Sutcliffe, 2011). (Pettersen & Schulman, 2019) emphasized the organizational 
capabilities to adopt the systemwide processing to adapt to the different stages of operations, systemwide processing supports the interdependent 
systems to recover at the nonroutine time at the stages of operations disruption, failure and recovery. 
HROs operations are based on a centralized system design to prevent accidents and achieve reliability performance, centralized command 
enhances HROs systems’ capacity to respond rapidly and proficiently to the abnormalities, which intimidate the system components (Hopkins, 
2009). Despite the benefits of systemwide processing and centralization for HROs safety, systemwide processing causes an overwhelming 
cognitive processing for senior executives to keep accounting for all the possibilities (Bierly & Spender, 2016; olde Scholtenhuis & Dorée, 2014). 
The activities of accident prevention and disaster control signify the role of systemwide processing, such practices could be across organizations 





perturbations rapidly in between systems (Bierly III & Spender, 1995), which could prevent disasters by applying the centralized commands to 
appropriately amend the general system motions and apply the needed procedures. Building on these, the following proposition was established: 
Proposition 7: In HROs, systemwide processing endorses reliability performance and decreases the possibility of errors. 
3.1.9 Institutional  
A common denominator of HROs is the ability to sustain an outstanding performance over long periods, which stands as an evidence of a 
high class institutional setting that endorses the system capabilities to maintain reliability and safe operations. (Catino & Patriotta, 2013) addressed 
that, HROs institutional setting reflects a pattern of efficient control over interactions between safety culture and values from one side, and 
cognition and emotions on the other side. HROs knowledge system reinforces the strong safety culture which represents the shared knowledge 
built up through training and learning process (Bierly & Spender, 2016). (Milosevic et al., 2018) deliberated that, the ability to create new 
knowledge when needed endorses the HROs systems to keep resourceful knowledge repertories and update the operations manual. Retaining 
reliability performance within complex and tightly coupled systems confirms the efficiency and supportiveness of the knowledge system and 
communications channels that facilitate the knowledge flows to combine the individuals’ knowledge and shapes reliability performance.  
While learning from errors is a fundamental practice among the common folk of organizations to ensure safety and promote their 
performance, HROs systems give trial-and-error learning a very limited opportunity owing to the disastrous consequences of errors (Karl E Weick, 





of training (Clarke, 1993; Enya et al., 2018). Moreover, HROs developed a continuous learning approach to compensate for the difficulty of 
learning by trialing (Edmondson, 1999; Karl E Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). Several studies have suggested that, HROs systems leverage continuous 
learning as a fundamental function of the systems (Catino & Patriotta, 2013; Reason, 2016; Ron, Lipshitz, & Popper, 2006; W. Sutcliffe, 2006; 
Karl E Weick, 1987), continuous learning permits the organizational structure to develop new knowledge and produce the reliability performance 
that guides the actions needed to handle complexity and dynamicity (Milosevic et al., 2018; Reason, 1990; Zhao, 2011). Furthermore, by creating 
the needed knowledge to support handling the present situations it also supports the system to sustain finer engagement in the future situations 
(Bass & Milosevic, 2018). Building on these, the following proposition was established: 
Proposition 8: In HROs, the institutional setting endorses reliability performance and decreases the possibility of error. 
3.1.10 Redundant 
HROs represent highly redundant systems, HROs include many redundant systems to substitute the primary systems in case of failure. 
(LaPorte & Consolini, 1991) believed that, the role of redundant systems is to preserve and foster the reliability performance at the time of 
nonroutine. Furthermore, (Karl E Weick et al., 2008) suggested that, implementing redundant systems is crucial to keep responsive to the 
potentially hazardous technical issues and prevent failures (Pettersen & Schulman, 2019). However, redundant systems endorse reliability 
performance and reserve the capacity to cope with the uncertainty of irregular events, redundancy in HROs may take a different form fault tolerant 





According to (Bierly III & Spender, 1995), moderating the relationship between the need for trust in system in one hand, and skepticism and 
preoccupation with failure on the other hand is a problematic issue in the high-hazard environments. Regarding theories, HRT trusts redundancy 
to prevent disasters and enhance the fault tolerance capabilities as HROs follows the reliability oriented design (Burgazzi & Pierini, 2007; Clarke, 
1993), still NAT believes that redundancy increases the systems complexity, which feeds the hazard nature of organizations. However redundant 
systems is believed to increase the likelihood of normal accidents according to NAT, the theory considers the implementation of the redundancy 
as an efficient strategy to deal with the corresponding failures while redesigning the systems in high-hazard environments (Burgazzi & Pierini, 
2007; Rijpma, 1997; Karl E Weick et al., 2008).  
Although HROs systems rely on redundant systems as second layer of protection against failures, (Clarke, 1993) indicated that redundant 
systems are also subject to accidents. Failure of redundant systems denotes that, the organization has to deal with interdependence of failure events 
within two systems and take consequences of two propagative failures (McChrystal et al., 2015), Three Mile Island TMI disaster 1979, 
Pennsylvania USA, was developed by a consecutive failure of primary and secondary cooling circuits in addition to failure of the relief valve – a 
redundant system - which led to a severe damage for the water reactor (Broughton, Kuan, Petti, & Tolman, 1989). Moreover, investment in the 
redundant systems represent a heavy cost to the organization budget. Yet, the criticisms to redundancy are justified; either failure or the high cost 
of redundant systems, but still the wisdom of HROs trust in redundancy is not a question. Building on these, the following proposition was 
established: 





3.2 The Framework of Structural Reliability (FSR) 
The identified characteristics were used to develop the structural based reliability framework (FSR). The proposed framework provides a 
measure of the reliability of organizations and makes it possible to properly introduce this phenomenon, the measurable framework enhances the 
knowledge about HROs. Utilizing the FSR to the organizations facilitates the process of assessing the safety performance of organizations working 
in high-hazard environments. FSR enables to track the progression of the development efforts towards reliable performance and safer operations. 
FSR comprises 10 characteristics which shape the organizations safety performance, the characteristics are outlined in Table 3. Two dominant 
forces were presented in the framework; hazard and safety, these forces interact with each other to produce the reliability performance.  
4. Table 3 
5. Structural Framework of High Reliability Organizations (FSR) 
Dimension Characteristics 
High Hazard organizations HHO 
An organization working in high hazard context, 
Consequently, the organization failed to sustain error-free operations 
and accidents and disasters are inevitable. 
  High Reliability Organizations HRO 
An organization which is well financed and boosted to have the right capabilities to 
prevent failures and disasters under high hazard conditions. Although the operations are nearly 
error-free, a small fault amid such hazard contexts would lead to a disaster. 
Hazard 
Hazardous 
Failures and accidents are unpreventable and The organization does 
not employ the competencies and expertise needed to response to 
contingencies events. 
The high hazard challenge the organizational capabilities to balance the forces of high hazard 
and safety and sustain performance by means of accident prevention. 
Tightly Coupled 
Tight coupling and interdependences makes the more skeptical to 
accidents and disasters. Tight coupling spread the failures between the 
interdependent systems. 
Tightly coupled systems are convenient for centralized control and keep the systemwide 
commands more efficient. Tight coupling endorse accident prevention by spreading 
transmitting the perturbations and prevent developing errors. 
Complex 
Tight coupling contributes to the system complexity which is already 
exist because of the multidimensional relations between the 
organization system and surrounding environment. Categorization 
and simplicity makes the system 
The system ensures that, the complex interrelations are well-understood and the complex of 
hazard operations are well attended and the implications of which, are accounted for.  
Dynamic 
Dynamicity requires high responsiveness and timely interactions 
which are not afforded due to the complexity of operations that creates 
difficulty to timely adjust and adapt to change. 
The system is very sensitive to change in surroundings and actions are migrating to expertise 
where they are. Furthermore, at the time of nonroutine, the system allows considerable 
flexibility to neutralize the hazard events.  
Bureaucratic 
The practices are pre-established and the hazard consequences cause 
the system to be crumbling since complex tight coupling technologies 
are not appreciated as they should be. 
The operations are executed following to the operations manual which accounted for relatively 
all possibilities of hazard events and the prescribed procedures are extensively reviewed. 







The organization would experience tension of competing 
organizational goals and interests such as production size, and safety 
goals which make the activities less focused on safety. 
Maintaining reliable performance is the main objective of the organizations and all the 
activities navigate towards the direction of safety. Safety principles govern the operations to 
ensure that the operations remain error-free and the cognitive processing endorses the decision 
making processes. 
Failure Intolerant 
The organization would be more tolerant to the errors and there is a 
tendency to find someone to blame for failures which weaken the 
accident prevention policies and create a tendency to be insensible to 
problems if they are not directly concern to the individual mission. 
In the core of the organizational culture, the failure intolerance is central to preserve the 
reliability performance, at the time of nonroutine, problems are accurately addressed and 
resolved with no blame on individuals. At this time, the system takes the opportunity to review 
the operations procedures and learn new lessons. 
Systemwide processing 
While the systems are managed separately, centralization enables the 
system to deal with the interdependences but still complexity are 
difficult to be understood in the absence of systemwide processing 
function. 
The system can adjust between centralized control, which fits well with the tightly coupled 
technologies and decentralized control that facilitates managing the complexity.  
Institutional 
The organization benefits from errors as opportunities to learn and 
create knowledge, these errors are often joined by disastrous 
consequences. Although the system is luckily engaging in knowledge 
creation practices, the information accessibility is challenging owing 
to the dynamicity. 
The organizational learning, training, continuous learning and knowledge creations stand as a 
backbone of the reliability performance, the knowledge system works alongside with the 
communication channels to provide individuals with the information needed for preserving the 
reliability performance. The system relies on simulations owing to the failure orientation and 
intolerance. 
Redundant 
Redundant systems increase the probability of disasters owing to the 
difficulty to control the system since the organization is already 
experience an overwhelming structural complexity coming from the 
tight coupling . 
At the time of nonroutine, redundant systems are substituting the failed components to preserve 
the performance, redundancy is significant principle of HROs operations to reduce uncertainty.  
 
6. DISCUSSION 
Much discussions about high-reliability performance fluctuate between very optimistic or pessimistic views about the organizational 
capabilities to survive accidents in high-hazard environments, the optimistic discussions are often from HRT theorists against the pessimistic view 
from NAT. Past research tends to be more biased towards one of the two theories, a lack of cohesion in deliberating the structural features of the 
organizations hinders the development of a general framework that provides an understanding of how safety performance be produced under the 
high-reliability theme, and how accidents could be prevented under the trying conditions. Previous discussions have shifted the focus from what 
makes the organizations risky to what makes them safe regarding the stand point of the researchers from Safety I or Safety II. However, in this 





develop a general framework of HROs. To avoid the organizational bias while developing the framework, the insights from the interviews in stage 
one were validated by the characteristics of organizations from the literature in stage two.  
HROs count on the safety measures of reliability performance to improve safety in operations, achieving high-reliability performance denotes 
that the organizations have demonstrated the capabilities which enabled preventing the errors that could lead to disasters. Within high-hazard 
environments, the inherent imperfections of human capabilities could seriously undermine the performance and prevent sustaining reliability 
performance. Therefore, individuals are required to develop a positive attitude towards failures and bound by the safety codes and afford an active 
engagement in operations. Giving the fact that, not all hazard situations would present warning signs, instead of relying on expectations, individuals 
are needed to have an adequate understanding of the challenging conditions of their workplace since relying on expectations would serves as 
hazardous frame of reference owing to the hazard nature that hinders their abilities to predict and prevent potential disasters.  
Regarding the theoretical perspectives, integrating the characteristics into an organizational framework cannot be an instant action, adopting 
the characteristics of HROs has never been, nor could it be an easy quest but rather the organizations need to scrape through the reliability passage 
day after day to obtain a safer performance under the risk of hazard events. Regarding the correlation between reliability and resilience, both 
capabilities stands for significant asset of the organizations, while reliability performance works as a shield that significantly decreases the 
probability of failures, resilience enhances the ability to survive the disasters and keep moving forward. From NAT point of view, resilience would 
be more favorable for organizations to survive since organizations could not prevent the accidents. Nevertheless, reliability and resilience are 





6.1 FSR as a Source of High-Reliability 
The proposed framework associates the characteristics of the organizations with the determinants of safety and hazard in Figure 1. The 
interactions between the determinants of safety and hazard promotes the system capability to manage the risk factor attached to hazard events. 
Further, the structural framework is a key determinant to achieve the reliability performance however, solely it cannot explain how HROs limit 
the risks of hazard events and operate safely in high-hazard environments. Figure 2 incorporates the hazard and safety forces in relation to the 
characteristics to illustrate how organizations manage hazard and uncertainty within the framework. HROs are required to consider the impact of 
hazard events in their operations so as to afford the convenient technical and intellectual capabilities to prevent any developing contingencies and 
resolve the paradoxical implications which are embraced from the continuous interaction between hazard and safety forces, the interactions shape 
the practices within the organizational framework. While tight coupling and high complexity of systems feed the hazard forces of HROs, reliability 
performance significantly benefit from this combination that provides insightful lessons for organizing safety work in high-hazard environments. 
HROs operations tend to be more committed, attentive and responsive to hazard events owing to the dynamicity and relatively bureaucratic control 
of HROs systems. On the other hand, the institutional setting and employment of redundancy feed the safety inclinations of HROs systems. Safety 
















Although the organizational scholars could have a common understanding of what HROs are, to our knowledge there is no unified definition 
in the literature. In this respect, a common definition of HROs will provide a better understanding for scholars and practitioners. Mostly the 
researchers define HROs in a narrow sense of their research environments, many definitions are focused on certain features, what makes the 
definitions incomplete or even have little relation to the theoretical insights or the original objectives of HRT founders. Previous definitions 





characteristics were carefully considered to provide a comprehensive definition of high-reliability organizations. HROs represent the combination 
of organizational mindful practices, advanced technologies and standardized systemwide processes, which qualify the system to operate reliably 
under risky, high complex and hazardous environments, the system can predict, prevent and control hazard events in operations at acceptable 
levels of performance and sustain the availability of services with outstanding safety records over long periods.  
The definition highlights five key points, the role of management in operating HROs safely in respect to organizational mindfulness (Karl E 
Weick et al., 2008), complex technology involvement, high-hazard environment and the safety records sustainability in respect to NAT (Charles 
Perrow, 2011) and the strong organizational culture (Bierly & Spender, 2016). Furthermore, the ability of the systems to foresee the risk sparks 
together with the ability to engage and correct the hazard events represent significant qualities of HROs operations. HROs systems possess the 
ability to bounce back quicker and stronger than any other organizations by means of their capacity to manage high complex interdependent 
technologies under the conditions of high-risk (Charles Perrow, 1994; K. M. Sutcliffe, 2011). the findings of this research inconsistent with (Charles 
Perrow, 2011) proposal to evaluate the performance of organizations working in high-hazard environments as a binary classification, NAT suggests 
that the systems are either reliable and functional or hazardous which is considered of low credibility.  
6.2 The Organizational Forces  





Preserving the high-reliability performance represents a joint venture. At the organizational level, the tightly coupled systems are needed to 
work in harmony to employ the organizational resources efficiently. The enactment of mindfulness is required to sensibly guide decisions and 
behaviors towards obtaining reliability performance, the organizational mindfulness govern the practices of recruiting, training, monitoring and 
maintenance. Mutual auditing is required to assure that individuals comply with the standardized and rigorous procedures to prevent accidents and 
produce high-reliability performance. Regarding the bureaucratic control, at the time of nonroutine, relatively flexible control is needed whence 
expertise intervention would prevent developing contingencies and system failures. At the individual level, adequate training and experiences are 
obligatory for compelling to the prescribed procedures. The knowledge system uses continual awareness as a foundation to learn and generate new 
knowledge which is needed for understanding the complex system and be able to attune to the customary and unfamiliar signals. At the macro 
level, the role of government policies is to obligate the HROs to bind with the chains of the laws and standards towards assuring stability of the 
industries and reliability of operations. Moreover, the government moderates the interrelations between organizations to create a supportive 
environment to share the knowledge and expertise needed for controlling the dynamic systems and prevent disasters across organizations.  
Safety orientation and failure intolerance are two fundamental principles of HROs, these principles outline the activities within the 
framework. Complying with these principles, individuals utilize the systemwide controls to accommodate routine and nonroutine events and avoid 
failures. Regarding the institutional setting, the high-risk of hazard events, failure intolerance and safety orientation denote that, trial based learning 
and training are relatively forbidden due to the high uncertainty accompanying experimentations. Similarly, introducing new technologies to HROs 





would induce a structural reforming process which inspires technological improvements to achieve reliability performance. Drawing on 
anthropological perspectives of HROs environments, this research suggests that, a well-built organizational culture underlies the collective efforts 
to produce reliability performance, augmented practices are being employed into the formal and the informal aspects to make the decisions based 
on logic. In turn, the well-established institutional setting endorses the reliability culture to handle the process of acquiring the organizational 
culture throughout stages of training, observing and performing according to the safety standards.  
6.2.2 Hazard Forces 
The risk of hazard events in HROs operations represents a motivation to achieve the high-reliability performance, paying attention to the 
severe hazard in operations induces the system to adopt convenient principles and procedures which are needed to control the potential failures. 
Failure to appreciate the hazard nature of HROs operations carries risks that the powerful tightly-coupled complex systems could be so erratic in 
the high-hazard environments, the disastrous consequences affecting equipment and individuals. Dealing with high-hazard systems requires 
interventions from two perspectives; accident prevention and adopting a rigorous attitude towards the inconvenient technologies or practices which 
are considered unfitting for the hazard contexts and possibly lead to failures. Furthermore, hazard nature motivates the organization to stay 
continuously striving for safety and maintain reliability performance which would be a major disaster when the organization takes it as a stopping 





While tight coupling makes the operations more complex and allow failures to spread smoothly between the interconnected systems, it also 
facilitates the systemwide processing in operations commands which becomes a must within the highly interdependent systems to preserve 
reliability performance. Furthermore, dynamicity aligns with tight coupling to increase the complexity of systems by speeding up the propagation 
of errors to develop complex disasters. In the contrary, dynamicity enhances the effectiveness of the knowledge system to create new knowledge 
and update the knowledge repertories to promptly detect, correct, and carefully analyze errors while going through nonroutine events. In the 
meanwhile, the bureaucratic control limits the ability to create new knowledge in the routine time since the system trusts the known procedures to 
respond appropriately and neutralize the hazard. There is tension exists in the system because of the bureaucratic control needed for stabilizing the 
reliability performance and the urge to disregard the standardized procedures at the time of nonroutine. 
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Preserving safety is the ultimate goal for HROs, operations in high-hazard environments are luckily to develop disasters with consequences 
of massive destruction, and even loss of human life. Giving that the missions of HROs are essential for the economic and social systems, preventing 
accidents in such organizations attracted high attention from scholars, practitioners and governments owing to the high cost of failures which 
outweigh the expected benefits. This research adopted mixed method of interviewing and literature review to understand how HROs sustain safety 
in operations over long periods, and develop the structural based reliability framework FSR which incorporates the seeming traits of the 
organizations with the organizational forces that shape the reliability performance. The long experiences of interviewees and from the grasp 





reliability performance represent a combination of high quality practices of recruiting, training, learning and auditing in presence of supportive 
policies with reference to the safety measures and accident prevention programs, which provide a solid foundation for consistently safe 
performance. This research contributes to the organizations literature by defining key characteristics and terms of reliability organizations in 
relation to the real-world experience of HROs but still not clear how to assess these characteristics. Therefore, the findings of this research suggest 
that, there is a need for more empirical research to evaluate these characteristics to know to what extent they contribute to the safety of 
organizations. There is a need for more study about the benefits of mindfulness practices to enhance the self-awareness and attention and how that 
contribute to the safety of organizations. Furthermore, the structural framework can be standardized and applied across organizations in different 
industries to anticipate whether the structure of the organization would produce reliability performance or not and also learn about their 






FSR: Framework of Structural Reliability  
HRT: High-Reliability Theory  
NAT: Normal Accident Theory 
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HROs: High-Reliability Organizations 
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HRA: Human Reliability Analysis 
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